Linguistics by Halle, Morris et al.
XXV. LINGUISTICS
Jakobson
Halle
A. Chomsky
A. Brody
Bromberger
A. Fodor
F. Garrett
L. Hale
W. Harris
W. Hohepa
A. Akmajian
Ivonne A. Bordelois
J. S. Bowers
M. K. Brame
Joan W. Bresnan
D. Caplan
A. D. Carstairs
P. W. Culicover
F. C. Dell
R. A. Faraci
Susan D. Fischer
Gillian H. Gane
Academic and Research Staff
Prof. J. J. Katz
Prof. R. P. V. Kiparsky
Prof. G. H. Matthews
Prof. W. A. O'Neil
Prof. J. R. Ross
Dr. T. G. Bever
Dr. S. Davis
Dr. M. D. Ginsberg
Dr. F. W. Heny
Dr. J. Limber
Graduate Students
M. Helke
T. J. Klokeid
Judith Kornfeld
Johanna Kovitz
Diane Kravif
A. S. Kroch
Nancy R. La Pelle
H. B. Lasnik
W. R. Leben
Joan Maling
J. M. Meadors
Dr. H. G. Nutini
Dr. D. M. Perlmutter
Dr. H. Rosemont, Jr.
Dr. Virginia V. Valian
Dr. E. C. T. Walker
E. S. Clifton, Jr.
Carol S. Kiparsky
U. Ornan
Joyce S. Pepi
Eva Ruzickova
Minoru Nakau
Emily N. Pope
R. B. Rardin II
J. T. Ritter
Sylvia R. Schwartz
Elizabeth Selkirk
Diana B. Shapero
Jean R. Vergnaud
D. C. Vetter
T. Wasow
G. Williams
Deirdre Wilson
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
There have been two main traditions in the study of language in modern times. The
first is the tradition of "universal" or "philosophical grammar," which flourished in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in intimate connection with philosophy and specu-
lative psychology. The second is the tradition of modern linguistics, a nineteenth and
twentieth century phenomenon that was also closely interwoven with the philosophy, psy-
chology, and anthropology of its day. Philosophical grammar was concerned with
general, universal principles of language structure; it attempted to ground these prin-
ciples in a theory of mental processes, and to illustrate them with detailed study of par-
ticular languages. By modern standards, the work lacked care and attention to detail,
and the conclusions that were reached, though often highly insightful, were deficient in
empirical support and sharpness of formulation. In comparison, modern nineteenth and
twentieth century linguistics has achieved a much higher standard of rigor, and has accu-
mulated linguistic data of an incomparably greater scope and variety. It has been limited,
however, by a much narrower interpretation of the purposes and goals of linguistic
science. It has eschewed theory construction in favor of elaboration of methods of
analysis, and it has not been concerned with linguistic universals - often, in fact, it has
denied that there are, in any significant sense, genuine and deep universal principles
that constrain the form and use of human language.
The work in linguistics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology represents, in a
sense, a synthesis of these two major traditions. In terms of its general goals and even
many of its specific hypotheses, this work has a very classical flavor. But in the range
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and reliability of evidence and precision of formulation, this work accepts and attempts
to surpass the standards of modern structuralism.
For classical linguistics, a central property of human language is what we can call
its "creative" aspect, that is, its unboundedness and freedom from stimulus control.
Under ordinary circumstances, what a person says is not determined by the stimuli that
impinge on him or by identifiable physiological states, to any significant degree. The
unboundedness of normal language is evident from the fact that almost every linguistic
utterance produced and understood is quite new, not similar in any physically defined
sense to those that have been produced in the past experience of the language user, and
not conforming to familiar or memorized patterns, in any meaningful sense of the notion
"pattern." Nor are these utterances "generalizations" from past experience, in any
sense of "generalization" known to psychology or philosophy. Nor can language use be
described in terms of "habits" or "repertoires of responses." In recognizing these facts,
philosophical grammar was entirely correct and to the point.
To account for this creative aspect of normal language use, we must attribute to the
language user knowledge of a certain organized system of rules that establish a sound-
meaning relation for an infinite class of sentences. This knowledge is, of course, quite
unconscious, but it is nonetheless perfectly real. Thus it is quite likely that no one
reading this report has ever seen, heard, or produced the sentence
(1) What disturbed John was being disregarded by everyone.
Yet every reader will understand that the sentence may be roughly paraphrased by either
(2) or (3):
(2) Everyone was disregarding the thing that disturbed John.
(3) The fact that everyone was disregarding him disturbed John.
Thus sentence (1) is ambiguous, its possible interpreations being (2) or (3). If the word
"our" is inserted in (1), giving (4), the sentence is unambiguous.
(4) What disturbed John was our being disregarded by everyone.
The interpretation of (4) can only be along the lines of (3), with "him" replaced by "us."
Or, to choose an example from a totally different sphere of language, speakers of English
would know that the plural of the word dap is daps, whereas that of linch is linches (with
es rather than s), in spite of the fact that most of the speakers would neither know the
meanings of these words nor have heard them before.
A speaker of English has knowledge of these facts and numerous others without having
been exposed to these sentences or to any explicit "teaching." He has mastered a system
of rules that determine both the phonetic form of sentences (1)-(4) and their various
semantic interpretations. The first task of the linguist who is investigating the structure
of English is to try to determine this system of rules, the system that is called the " gen-
erative grammar of English." This generative grammar has in some manner been inter-
nalized by every speaker of English; it determines the pairing of sound and meaning for
an indefinitely large range of possible sentences. It is this internalized generative gram-
mar that makes possible the normal, "creative" use of language.
The discovery of the generative grammar of English, and other languages, is, how-
ever, only the first task that faces the linguist. To the extent that such grammars have
been developed and validated, the linguist can then turn to the question of how they are
put to use, by the speaker or hearer, in normal conversation, in literature, in internal
monologue, and so on. Furthermore, he can turn to the basic problem of classical lin-
guistics: What are the universal principles that limit the form of such generative gram-
mars? Clearly, there must be universal principles with a very narrow and limiting
character. If this were not true, it would be impossible for the child, presented with
scattered samples of a language for an extremely short period, to determine for himself
the generative grammar of this language. But this is a task that normal humans accom-
plish with great facility. This indicates that they must approach the task forearmed with
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highly specific advance knowledge (obviously, unconscious) of the possible form that a
generative grammar must assume. To put it loosely, although the child cannot "know"
in advance whether the language to which he is exposed is English, Chinese, and so on,
he must "know" that it is a "human language" of a highly special sort, which can only
vary in very restricted ways. The problem of "universal grammar," now, as in the
seventeenth century, is to determine the principles that limit the variety of human
language and make possible the acquisition of language. To the extent that such principles
can be formulated and validated, we gain insight of an unparalleled kind into the innately
determined character of human mental processes.
We feel that recent work, much of it carried out at M. I. T. , makes it possible to
formulate a fairly precise theory of universal grammar in this sense, a theory which is,
furthermore, reasonably well supported by substantial empirical evidence from a variety
of languages. The major goal of our research, then, is to sharpen and deepen the theory
of generative grammar, and to use it as a basis for the study of cognitive processes.
Since many of the problems of language lie in the area in which several disciplines
overlap, an adequate and exhaustive treatment of language demands close cooperation
of linguistics with other sciences. The inquiry into the structural principles of human
language suggests a comparison of these principles with those of other sign systems,
which, in turn, leads naturally to the elaboration of a general theory of signs, semiotics.
Here linguistics touches upon problems that have been studied by philosophy. Other
problems of interest to logicians - and also to mathematicians - are touched upon in the
studies devoted to the formal features of a general theory of language. The study of
language in its poetic function brings linguistics into contact with the theory and history
of literature. The social function of language cannot be properly illuminated without
the help of anthropologists and sociologists. The problems that are common to lin-
guistics and the theory of communication, the psychology of language, the acoustics and
physiology of speech, and the study of language disturbances are too well known to need
further comment here. The exploration of these interdisciplinary problems, a major
objective of this group, will be of benefit not only to linguistics; it is certain to provide
workers in the other fields with stimulating insight and new methods of attack, as well
as to suggest to them new problems for investigation and fruitful reformulations of ques-
tions that have been asked for a long time.
M. Halle, N. A. Chomsky
A. PSYCHOLOGICAL REALITY OF THE LEXICALIST
HYPOTHESIS
The relation among derived nominals, gerunds, and verbs has been investigated by
examining the confusions among these classes. Subjects were presented with mixed lists
of such items and required to pick the recurring items from subsequently presented sim-
ilar lists.
In experiment I, subjects were presented with four pairs of lists. The first list of
each pair (the inspection list) contained 50 words, each of which was either a verb (V),
a derived nominal (DN), or a gerund (G); the category of each item was randomly
selected. The second list (the response list) was made up of the same roots, but the
choice of V, DN, or G was again made at random. Thus, there was approximately 1
chance in 3 that a particular item would be identical on the inspection and response lists.
Subjects were given 30 sec to examine a list; response lists were presented immediately
following the inspection lists. Results of this experiment were similar to those reported
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below for experiments II and III, but the differences were not statistically significant.
In experiments II and III the procedure was similar to that for experiment I, except
that each test word was presented in a sentence context. The lists were only 25 sentences
long rather than 50 words long. The test item (G, DN, or V) was underlined in each
sentence. Context sentences were kept as similar as the shift in class would permit.
In experiment II inspection lists were viewed for 75 sec; the response list was presented
immediately following the inspection list. In experiment III inspection lists were viewed
by the subjects for 3 min; the presentation of the response list was delayed 15 min (sub-
jects were required to perform an irrelevant distracting task during this interval).
In experiments II and III, DN' s were identified as V' s significantly more often than
as G' s; G' s were identified as V' s significantly more often than as DN' s; in experi-
ment III, V' s were identified significantly more often as DN' s than as G's. Put another
way, DN and G were least likely to be confused with each other, and V and DN were
most likely to be confused with each other, with the likelihood of V and G confusions
somewhere intermediate.
These results suggest that both verbs and derived nominals and verbs and gerunds
are more closely related to each other than are derived nominals and gerunds. In exper-
iment III, the results suggest further that verbs and derived nominals are more closely
related than are verbs and gerunds. Thus we might represent the relationships as
Verb (1) Derived Nominal
(2) 3
(3)
Gerund
where distances represent relative degree of relatedness. At present, these results
must be advanced with some caution. A variety of experimental factors that might prove
relevant are being explored.
Unless the difference between (2) and (3) is explained nonsyntactically, these results
seem to best fit a psychological model based on the lexicalist hypothesis (see Chomskyl).
Verbs and derived nominals would be assumed to be closely related because they stem
directly from the same lexical entry, while gerunds would be expected to be related to
verbs and not to derived nominals, because of the involvement of the former in the trans-
formational derivation of the gerund.
D. Caplan
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B. STRUCTURE IN SENTENCE MEMORY
Some words from a sentence prompt recall of that sentence better than others. It
appears that the grammatical relation of the prompt to the rest of the sentence deter-
mines its effectiveness as a prompt, and this hypothesis is supported by the observation
that an increase in the number of relations involving the prompt word increases its
effectiveness as an aid to recall. 2 These findings support the view that one remembers
a sentence in a linguistically coded form.
While this is both experimentally and intuitively supported for long-term memory,
there is no obvious reason to suppose that the same should be true of immediate mem-
ory, which is sometimes thought to be simply a transduction of the input signal. None-
theless, similar behavioral consequences of grammatical relations are observed. For
example, the latency with which one provides the next word, given some word from a
previously presented sentence, is less when the same words are grammatically related
than when they are not related. 3
When two words are presented for recognition (in order to overcome the requirement
of surface structure contiguity imposed by the next word task), a noun and verb in sub-
ject relation, in either matrix or embedded sentence are recognized more quickly than
pairs of the same nouns and verbs which are not so related.
4 Thus, in sentences like
The scouts the Indians saw killed a buffalo
the probes Indians saw and scouts killed are recognized faster than scouts saw and
Indians killed. Furthermore, probes containing scouts tend to be more quickly recog-
nized than those containing Indians.
Among other things, the object relation of scouts and saw, and/or the matrix rather
than embedded stature of scouts, might account for facilitation of probes containing it.
Other research has shown that the order in which the words appear in a probe (noun-verb
or verb-noun) causes changes in recognition latency, depending on the relation of the
words in the sentence that is being tested. 5 Thus, given either active or passive ver-
sions of sentences like
The hostess delighted the foreigner
The foreigner was delighted by the hostess
hostess delighted is recognized faster than delighted hostess. On the other hand,
delighted foreigner was recognized faster in the active version and foreigner delighted,
in the passive version. The results suggest that an underlying subject relation facilitates
recognition, even at the expense of surface structure order, but that an underlying object
relation is of no effect.
An experiment was conducted to determine whether subject and object relations are
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facilitative in embedded and matrix sentences. Probes of every subject relation and
every object relation in the surface structure of the sentences below were recognized
faster when stated in noun-verb and verb-noun order, respectively.
1. The fool that the idiot advised advised the lunatic.
2. The fool that advised the idiot advised the lunatic.
3. The fool advised the idiot that advised the lunatic.
4. The fool advised the idiot that the lunatic advised.
Object relations were recognized slower in embedded sentences than in matrix sen-
tences, while subject relations were recognized equally quickly in both. The increase
of latency when object relations were probed in reverse order (noun-verb) was not so
great as that for subject relations.
If underlying (only) relations have similar effects, then there should be no preferred
order for probes containing head nouns of relative clauses in which the relation of the
head noun to the embedded verb differs from that to the matrix verb (1 and 3, above).
The hypothesis was supported when the subject noun was relativized (1), but disconfirmed
when the object noun was relativized (3). For some speakers, the last case is ambigu-
ous: the relative clause either modifies the object noun or has been post-posed from
the subject noun-phrase. The results are consistent with this view, but it has no other
support within this experiment.
It is clear then that even immediate memory is linguistically coded. In all cases
examined here surface and underlying structure are congruent, since the aforementioned
head nouns provide equivocal results. Therefore, no decision can be reached about
whether the encoded form is adequately described by surface structure or depends on
some deeper analysis.
E. C. T. Walker
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C. ACQUISITION OF CONDITIONED RULES
Children' s appreciation of the consequences of certain linguistic constraints has been
investigated by using imitation, paraphrase, and judgments of preference. Children
from 49 to 57 months old were studied; each child was interviewed at least 6 times at
intervals of approximately 2 weeks. The linguistic constraints examined were the fol-
lowing.
A. Putatively global constraints
1. Complex NP constraint (cf. Rossl
2. Crossover condition (cf. Postal2).
B. Phrase structure constraints
1. Strict subcategorization rules.
2. Selectional restrictions.
3. Volitionality in verb-verb restrictions (cf. Fischer and Marshall3).
C. Conditions on transformations and surface structures
1. Pronoun-object condition
2. Unspecified object deletion
3. Pronoun deletion in relative clauses
4. Equi-NP deletion
Sentences were presented in pairs. In one sentence a rule applied (or not applied,
if a condition would be violated by its application) correctly; in the other sentence, the
rule was misapplied. The child repeated each sentence, and was asked to choose which
sounded better and to give reasons for his choice. Occasionally he was asked to para-
phrase an ungrammatical sentence in order to determine how the sentence was being
interpreted.
All children proved to be sensitive to the complex NP constraint and insensitive to
the crossover condition. All children were able to talk about what was wrong with a
'semantic' violation better than a 'syntactic' one. They did, however, correct some
syntactic violations spontaneously in repetition, notably Equi-NP deletion, object pro-
noun deletion in relative clauses, and, with older children, subject-verb agreement.
Older children (and the same children as they became older) did better on phrase struc-
ture constraints than younger children.
The pronoun-object condition was followed with particle movement, but consistently
violated (in terms of adult grammar) with indirect object placement. When an unspeci-
fied object was incorrectly deleted, the resulting sentence was often interpreted as a
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passive. In relative clauses in which the subject pronoun was not deleted, the sentence
became incomprehensible. If the object pronoun was not deleted, the sentence was
understood as if the pronoun had been deleted. This result obtained also in the case of
Equi-NP deletion.
Of all rules considered, subject-verb agreement showed the most variation, both in
order of acquisition of that rule relative to other rules and in how the rule was acquired.
It seems that agreement came first with irregular verbs and later with regular ones.
When children finally have acquired the rule, it is the verb that agrees with the subject;
but before the rule is fully acquired, there is variation among children even in this
respect. This was the only transformational rule that we witnessed being acquired
by any of the children during the two and one-half months that we observed them
(cf. Fischer 4).
Susan D. Fischer
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D. DISCRIMINATION AMONG PHONES BY INFANTS
An attempt was made to teach infants (3 1/2-4 1/2 months old) to discriminate among
syllables beginning with 3 English phones. Two of these phones were perceptually iden-
tical, but acoustically distinct ([p] followed by two different vowels). The third was per-
ceptually and acoustically distinct ([g] followed by a third vowel). Infants in one group
were reinforced for responding to a set composed of the perceptually identical (for
adults) phones; e. g. , reinforced for [pi] and [pa] and not reinforced for [gu]. Infants
in a second group were reinforced for responding to a set composed of perceptually
distinct phones; e. g. , reinforced for [pi] and [gu] and not reinforced for [pa]. That
the first group succeeded in discriminating while the second group failed indicates
that the discrimination was a function of the perceptual identity of the phones in the
reinforced set. For, if the infants had depended on the acoustic distinctions among
the phones to discriminate, we should expect the second group to have succeeded
as well as the first. That perceptual constancy can be found at such an early pre-
verbal age suggests that this constancy depends on innately determined phonological
identities.
J. A. Fodor, M. F. Garrett, Diana B. Shapero
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E. TOWARD A THEORY OF SENTENCE INTERPRETATION
1, Introduction
The problem of sentence interpretation is essentially (i) to characterize the kinds of
information hearers must extract from the sentences of a discourse if they are to under-
stand it; (ii) to formulate explicit hypotheses about how a hearer could compute such
information, given the available input data; and (iii) to determine which of perhaps many
functionally equivalent hypotheses correspond to the strategies actually employed by
users of a language.
The research reported here is concerned with fragments of points (i) and (ii). While
the goal of a theory of sentence interpretation is a full account of (iii), it is clear that
progress in that direction presumes the explicit functional analyses indicated in (i) and
(ii) taken over a wide range of sentence types.
2. Syntactic Analysis
It is fair to suppose that a minimum requirement on the interpretation of an utterance
is an analysis of it into its main and subordinate sentences or clauses. We are exploring
the validity of the hypothesis that the first NP is the main sentence subject and the last
verb "paired" with it is the main V; while other clauses, relatives or complements, are
overtly marked and generally maintain their integrity in surface structure with the
exception that certain NP' s of those clauses may not be specified. Just as the main NP
and V must be determined and paired, so must each subject NP and V of the various
embedding types exemplified in (1)-(7) below. In order to accomplish this the missing
NP's must be identified.
(1) The professor that the students believed was arrested died.
(2) The boy students believed the professor expected died.
(3) The boy the students believed the professor expected to live died.
(4) The girl that Bill wanted to leave is lovely.
(5) The workers that appeared tired.
(6) The workers that appeared tired quit.
(7) The dog the rat bit died.
Analysis proceeds on a left-to-right basis, storing NP's in a last in-first out buffer,
NP dummy markers being inserted at relatives and infinitives where an NP must be
recovered and identified. Whenever a verb is encountered, the last-in NP which is not
a dummy is taken as its subject, and that NP or the dummy that went in after it is
removed from the buffer. All verbs are tentatively assumed to have object NP' s that
follow them, with the provision that only an NP dummy, identified by its predecessor
in the buffer, can be inserted to replace a missing object; as in an object relative (7).
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When the first NP put in the buffer is paired, its verb is considered the main verb, e. g.,
tired in (5) or died in (7); unless another unpaired verb turns up, e. g. , quit in (6) or
died in (1). Such V-V contiguities as appeared tired, believed was arrested, bit died,
etc. , require important decisions in the clausal recognition process: Does the first V
dominate the second as a complement fragment, e. g. , tired in (6), or is the second in
fact a higher V, e. g. , tired in (5) ? In spoken English, juncture and intonation provide
important cues; without these a decision cannot be finalized until the next word, if any,
is processed. Thus at tired in (6), juncture and sentence intonation aside, the workers
would be assigned to it as subject. Given quit, however, tired is no longer the last verb
to be paired, and barring conjunction, must be subordinate to appeared as a complement
fragment. Notice, however, that the workers is the subject NP for tired in either case,
(5) or (6). In general, when one has decided that a particular NP-V are the main sub-
ject and verb and another V is encountered, that NP-V combination must be reassigned
as a complement sentence to the prior verb.
3. Semantic Representation
Given an analysis of an utterance into its clausal structure, the burden of semantic
interpretation falls on the semantic representation of the words in those clauses. It
should be noted that the information contributed by syntactic and semantic analyses is
not independent (cf. Limber ). While the syntactic analysis described briefly above was
intended to operate for the most part on so-called function words and inflections, such
information is neither necessary nor sufficient for the interpretation of many sentences
in context.
If the semantic representation of a word is viewed as the contribution which that word
makes to the interpretation of its sentences, it appears that such representations are not
solely carriers of semantic material, but in some cases also act like functions or sub-
routines operating on context, discourse, and/or intra-sentence parameters whose out-
put is an inference relevant to the interpretation. The a sentences below suggest
inferences that might be drawn in conversation from the b sentences. These have been
discussed by Limber. 2' 3
(8) a According to state law, this water is warm enough to swim in.
b This water is warm enough to swim in.
(9) a Bob is fast at solving two-move chess problems.
b Bob is fast.
(10) a This knife is good for picking teeth.
b This knife is good.
(11) a Chess is easy to learn.
b Chess is easy.
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(12) a Quincy is tall for a basketball player.
b Quincy is tall.
(13) a Merrill suggested that we buy a goose for the secretary.
b Merrill suggested a goose for the secretary.
J. Limber
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